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Abstract 
This paper analyses Japan’s motivation for supporting the high-speed rail (HSR or bullet train) 
project in India, its largest ever single-country Official Development Assistance (ODA) yen 
loan project. The paper explores the strategic underlay for Tokyo’s new thinking about ODA 
projects, centered on ‘quality’ infrastructure, and argues that by nature, scale, and location, the 
HSR project is an outstanding example of Japan’s contemporary strategic aid. Concerned with 
‘comprehensive national security,’ this aid is mindful of Japan’s economic interests as well as 
its national security and defence. India’s rising economic potential as a huge future market has 
great appeal for Japan, but foremost it is India’s current strategic importance in the context of 
power shifts at Asian regional and global levels that steers Japan’s rising interest. The HSR 
project’s multiple strategic dimensions are also shaped powerfully by the moves of China, 
Japan’s key economic and strategic competitor. Since these circumstances heighten the 
strategic stakes for guiding the region’s infrastructure development, Japan’s HSR ODA project 
for ‘quality infrastructure’ in India provides new insights into not only the country’s current 
relationship with India, but also Tokyo’s broader thinking about strategic aid, especially 
through the ‘quality’ lens in its contemporary aid narrative.  
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Introduction 
As its largest ever Official Development Assistance (ODA) project in a single country, Japan has 
committed to fund a high-speed rail (HSR) line in India using Shinkansen bullet train technology. 
Connecting Mumbai with Ahmedabad and covering a distance of 508 Km, this is only 
Japan’s second off-shore project for an HSR, after its first in Taiwan that was completed in 2007. 
However, while Taiwan’s HSR was also based on Japanese Shinkansen technology and 
technical assistance from Japanese railway companies, the project was funded through private 
capital. In contrast, the Indian HSR project with an initial cost of US$15bn is funded largely 
through Japan’s yen loan program. The loan is provided on generous terms with an interest rate 
of 0.1 percent and repayment over 50 years with 15 years grace. 
 
Why has Japan been eager to support this huge infrastructure project in a country that mattered 
little just a decade or so ago? In fact, two decades ago Tokyo stridently criticized India for 
conducting nuclear bomb tests. Then both houses of the Japanese parliament passed a 
unanimous resolution condemning the Indian act, imposed economic sanctions and criticized 
India in international forums such as the United Nations. Japan was also not supportive of 
India’s bid for entry into such regional forums as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Political and economic interaction 
between the two nations remained insubstantial until just over a decade ago. Today, however, the 
geostrategic landscape – and Japan’s assessment of India within it – has shifted dramatically.1 
 
                                            
1 For example, by 2005 Japan was strongly supporting India’s membership in the East Asian Summit. 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html 
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This paper explores Tokyo’s motivations for supporting the immensely expensive HSR project 
in India as an example of Japan’s current thinking and practice in providing strategic, ‘quality 
infrastructure’ ODA, and for what it says about Japan’s current relationship with India. 
 
The paper argues that this exceptional ODA project is by its nature, scale, and location an 
outstanding example of Japan’s contemporary strategic aid, serving ends that are both practical 
and symbolic. Here, the concept of ‘strategic’ is concerned with Tokyo’s understanding of 
‘comprehensive security,’ which takes  into account not just national security and defence 
positioning, but also the  international economic interests that are intrinsic to securing the 
nation’s well-being. The HSR project provides Japan with opportunities to help satisfy its 
economic goals by promoting the overseas expansion of both Japanese companies and the 
effectiveness of its infrastructure system (MOFA 2017b, 308-310). But these economic goals 
also have vital strategic dimensions, especially since Tokyo recognizes a strategic imperative to 
set in place hardware that can generate and enhance its capacity to guide – or at least be involved 
in – the development of infrastructure and connectivity in the Asian region. The economic and 
strategic consequences of positioning at the infrastructure helm for the region and beyond are 
thus of major interest. 
 
Here, the imperative to act comes mainly from China, Japan’s major regional competitor. In 
recent years China has gained an advantage over Japan with generous infrastructure financing 
and cheque-book diplomacy across Asia through the mammoth Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
investment program. Indeed, in bidding to conduct a similar HSR aid project in Indonesia in 
2015, Japan lost out to China whose bid for the project involved no-strings finance. Losing in 
Indonesia boosted the strategic appeal to Japan of funding the first HSR in India. It was 
recognized that this move would not simply symbolize and fortify the strategic disposition 
between the two nations; importantly, Tokyo understood the value for Japan of the 
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‘demonstration effect.’ This HSR project could potentially serve as a catalyst for Japan’s 
involvement in similar hi-tech infrastructure projects in other countries. In addition, it could be a 
highly effective approach to ‘comprehensive security’ by helping to sharpen Japan’s competitive 
edge economically and strategically, especially vis á vis China. The China factor also explains 
why Tokyo has recast its ODA narrative to refer to ‘quality infrastructure’ as counterpoint to 
China’s BRI construction schemes that sometimes are seen to be lax in administration and 
execution. 
 
This paper analyses the bullet train project in India in the context of Japan’s ODA narrative that 
officially speaks of its infrastructure projects in terms of ‘quality growth,’ ‘quality infrastructure 
investment,’ and ‘partnership for quality infrastructure.’ In setting the context, the first part 
overviews the Japan–India relations of recent years, and the second considers Japan’s ODA 
program, exploring conceptual thinking around ‘quality’ infrastructure projects, the types of 
projects Tokyo chooses to fund, and why it still uses the yen loan program for so much of its 
ODA funding. The third section turns to Japan’s major ‘quality infrastructure’ ODA projects and 
their links to Japan’s new geo-political strategy of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific.’ Section four 
homes in on the HSR project in India, and the final section concludes the discussion and 
considers the prospects for Japan–India relations on this basis. Overall, the paper argues that 
Japan’s HSR project in India is motivated largely by Tokyo’s rising concern at Beijing’s 
increasing economic outreach and its military designs in Asia and elsewhere. The provision of 
such ‘quality infrastructure’ is thus aimed at advancing Japan’s strategic and economic position 
regionally and beyond the Asia Pacific Region.  
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Japan–India Relations: A Bird’s Eye View 
Japan–India relations are witnessing their most productive period in history. The recent 
literature presents rather positive assessments (e.g., Mukherjee and Yazaki 2016; Horimoto 
2017; Jain 2017) that are increasingly couched in the language of strategic partnership (Basrur 
and Kutty 2018). This contrasts with the earlier literature, as little as there was, that generally 
acknowledged the relationship as ‘‘distant’ (e.g., Vishwanathan 1993; Jain 1996) and at best 
urged stronger ties on the basis of earlier goodwill and the vast untapped areas of potential 
cooperation and convergence (Okata 1978; Seminar 1992; Yamazaki and Takahashi 1993; 
Kojima 2002). Separated strategically throughout the post-war period, small peaks of 
‘togetherness’ were soon followed by troughs; there were no medium or long-term shared 
interests or mutually beneficial ideas. And in 1998, India’s nuclear tests and Japan’s 
stronger-than-expected negative response plunged the relationship into an exceptional but brief 
nadir, which was only ended publicly when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India 
in August 2000 and declared India and Japan to be global partners. The move opened a new 
chapter in the bilateral relationship in the context of global and regional power shifts, and the 
relationship has moved steadily on an upward trajectory into the 21st century (Jain 2010, 
Horimoto 2017). 
 
Visiting India in April 2005, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi reaffirmed that the ‘global 
partnership’ between the two countries reflected the convergence of their long-term political, 
economic and strategic interests and announced several initiatives to strengthen this 
partnership.2 However, the strongest cheerleader for India among Japan’s top political leaders 
has been Shinzo Abe, who served as prime minister in 2006–7, and since returning to office in 
2012 has maintained this supportive position. Visiting India in 2007, Prime Minister Abe 
                                            
2 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html 
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delivered his renowned speech on ‘the confluence of two seas,’ emphasizing the importance of 
India as an Indian Ocean power for Japan as a Pacific Ocean resident (Jain 2007). Since 2007, 
Japanese prime ministers and Indian prime ministers have met annually in a summit setting that 
has served as a formal institution where the two leaders review progress and announce plans and 
actions for further strengthening their special global and strategic partnership. 
 
Economic relations based on trade and investment have strengthened but are still 
underperforming relative to their potential, given the improved investment climate in India and 
the bilateral economic partnership agreement signed by the two nations in 2011. In 2015, Japan 
was India’s 11th largest export partner and India was Japan’s 23rd largest, while for both, China 
was number one.3 Trade in actual dollar terms has in fact decreased over the years, from 
$18.5bn in 2012-13 to $13.5bn in 2016-17,4 though the presence of Japanese companies in India 
has increased from 550 in 2005 to 1369 in 2017 and is growing steadily. More than 9000 
Japanese nationals now stay and work in India compared to 4000 in 2009.5 Yet alongside this 
growth in bilateral trade and investment there has been a dramatic transformation in another 
aspect of the economic relationship, Japan’s official aid to India, which has increased 
exponentially through the 21st century as the funding for the bullet train epitomizes. Between 
2012 and 2016, Japan disbursed more than $15bn in yen-denominated loans to India.6 
 
The most significant development in this bilateral relationship in the 21st century is not, however, 
simply trade or investment. It has been the creation of a strategic level relationship. This largely 
explains the transformation in Japan’s ODA to India, since bilateral ODA projects in recent years 
                                            
3 JICA India Office. 
4  https://www.livemint.com/Politics/S7iA23p9KRrKMiWiy7YbqI/Indias-exports-to-Japan-halve-to-38
5-billion-in-four-year.html 
5 https://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/PDF/2017_co_list_en.pdf; 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html 
6 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000142555.pdf 
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have had strategic as well as economic purposes, as again the bullet train project epitomizes. 
Especially significant have been moves to institutionalize security arrangements. These include 
the Japan–India Comprehensive Security Dialogue inaugurated in 2001, the Joint Statement 
Towards a Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006, the Joint Declaration on 
Security Cooperation between Japan and India in 2008, and the bilateral 2+2 Dialogue between 
top-level defence and foreign affairs representatives since 2009, upgraded to ministerial level in 
2018 during the Abe-Modi summit in Tokyo. Defence chiefs of the two countries now visit each 
other regularly. Although India is still ambivalent, ideationally it now supports Japan’s concept 
of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ framework. Japan and India also now have a trilateral 
framework with the United States, which although not highly active includes the Malabar naval 
exercises comprising the U.S., India, and Japan as permanent members. Overall though, India 
maintains its ‘strategic autonomy’ narrative and conducts diplomacy through a 
multi-engagement approach to foreign policy rather than being bound by an alliance relationship, 
as New Delhi does not want to be beholden to a particular group of allies and partners. 
 
These bilateral strategic arrangements have been inspired by major developments within and 
beyond the region. For Japan, they are to some extent a response to the decline in the influence of 
the United States, Japan’s major security partner, at the same time as interest in India has 
grown. They are also in response to Japan’s imperative to secure trade and energy networks 
based on critical maritime routes and to tap into the emerging market potential in Southeast 
Asia and beyond, partnering with India where necessary. Primarily, however, the moves are 
in response to an increasingly assertive China, which overtook Japan as the world’s no. 2 
economy just a few years back. Indeed, both Japan’s and India’s bilateral relations with China 
are intrinsic to their bilateral relations with each other. 
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Overall, Japan–India relations are strong and now fortified by shared strategic interests.7 As the 
rationale of Japan’s foreign policy has been identified more clearly on the basis of universal 
values like democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, India’s affirmation of these 
values helps to underscore their shared bilateral vision. Foreign policy initiatives have come 
from both sides, including the ‘India–Japan Vision 2025’ that envisages a ‘Special Strategic 
and Global Partnership’ aimed at securing the strategic stability and economic prosperity of 
the Indo-Pacific region, and has already culminated in the creation of the Asia–Africa 
Growth Corridor (AAGC) in 2017. 8 Japan has relinquished its resistance to recognizing 
India’s nuclear stance, which had been a sticking point in the relationship for some years. New 
Delhi has desperately and consistently sought from Tokyo what it had achieved with many other 
nations including the United States: recognition of India’s nuclear status through a civil nuclear 
cooperation agreement. The pursuit of closer strategic relations with India ultimately led Tokyo 
to shift its position and in November 2016 sign an agreement that came into force in July 2017 
(Tamari 2017).9 India is the only non-NPT signatory state with which Japan has a nuclear pact, 
again underlining India’s strategic importance for Japan. 
 
Leadership of the two nations is also significant in this picture. Momentum in Japan-India 
relations began some years back under earlier national leaders, but the current national leaders, 
Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe, and Narendra Modi, are staunch mutual supporters and committed 
to taking the relationship to new heights. In a piece in India’s leading daily newspaper Times of 
India, Abe affirmed his conviction that the India–Japan relationship has great potential. He 
                                            
7 Japan and India have been in discussion since 2011 about the sale of an amphibian aircraft to India, 
but this is yet to materialize. If the sale goes ahead, India will be the first to receive a state of the art 
ShinMaywa US-2 aircraft. This delay has, however, not caused bilateral friction between the two 
nations. 
8  http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Visi
on_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_of
_the_IndoPacific 
9 https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000202920.pdf 
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claimed that a ‘strong India is in the best interests of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best 
interests of India’ (Abe 2015) Likewise, Modi has claimed, ‘No nation has contributed so much 
to India’s modernization and progress as Japan – cars, metros and industrial parks, for example. 
And, no partner is likely to play as big a role in India’s transformation as Japan’ (quoted in Abe 
2015). Both leaders seemingly have staying power and are likely to push the relationship as far 
as possible without being in a military alliance, even with diverging views on some matters.  
 
Japan’s ODA: A Brief Background 
Japan’s ODA program is consistent with that of virtually all foreign aid donors in seeking to 
meet its own national interests as well as the needs of recipients. That is why cultivating 
economic opportunities for Japan has long been a component of Japan’s ODA program, and why 
infrastructure development has played a huge part in ODA projects. It is also why Japan’s ODA 
program is increasingly oriented to its pursuit of strategic objectives through projects that also 
meet recipients’ needs. Until 2010, Japan was the first and only Asian nation in the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), the western group of 30 industrialized and developed donor 
nations, and today it remains the fourth largest donor within the DAC.10 
 
Japan’s aid policy and its geographical focus were transformed quite significantly during the 
1990s and 2000s (Jain 2016). Once largely concentrated in Asia, the geographic span of Japan’s 
ODA policy now extends to almost all continents, covering some 150 countries. A most 
important divergence from Asia has been to Africa, where Japan engages most countries through 
the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD), a process established in 
1993. In policy terms, aid has evolved from pursuing largely economic interests, often expressed 
                                            
10  http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/OD
A-2017-complete-data-tables.pdf. South Korea is the second Asian nation to join DAC (in 2010). 
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in a mercantilist framework, to supporting Japan’s ‘comprehensive security’ policy, especially 
for securing vital resources, initially mainly oil from the Middle East. Tokyo also aligns its aid to 
the strategic interests of its principal ally, the United States, supplying aid to such frontline states 
as Turkey and Pakistan at the height of the Cold War for example. 
 
With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and against the background of severe domestic 
and international criticism suggesting that Japan’s huge foreign aid program lacked a clear 
philosophy, Tokyo set out a new ODA policy with a new philosophy articulated through official 
guidelines. The first ODA Charter was issued in 1992 and revised in 2003. A new version, now 
called the Development Cooperation Charter, was announced in 2015. The first ODA charter 
was released following the end of the Cold War and identified broad aims such as promoting 
democracy, human rights, and environmental protection, and opposing militarization. The 
revised Charter added human security as an important component of the nation’s aid philosophy. 
The 2015 Charter retains much of the philosophy and many of the aims outlined in the earlier 
versions, but unashamedly declares that Japan will use ODA to promote its national interests and 
pursue a policy of ‘proactive contribution to peace,’ neither of which were articulated in the 
earlier versions. Although Japan still maintains its policy of not providing ODA for military 
purposes, today Tokyo’s strategic deployment of ODA includes support for capacity building for 
maritime law enforcement in neighboring countries through the  supply of surveillance vessels, 
lifeboats, and aircraft to countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
 
One major component of Japan’s aid program that has distinguished it from the programs of 
many of its DAC peers is the extensive use of loans (on very generous terms) rather than grants 
(given gratis). Japan’s yen loan program was begun in 1958 to support infrastructure 
development in recipient nations. It still remains the mainstay of Japan’s aid program, although 
the nature and the types of infrastructure projects have changed to be better aligned with the 
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needs of recipient nations and with Japan’s own aid norms and principles. Japan is the number 
one DAC donor in terms of its share of loans to grants and technical programs. The ratio in 2017 
was close to 65:35, followed by France and Korea in distant number two and three positions.11 
 
While many DAC donors hardly use their ODA budget for loan programs, Japan’s rationale for 
ODA through loans rather than grants is the firm belief in ‘self-help’ so that recipient nations 
take responsibility for their projects. Thus, Japan funds the bulk of the project cost on generous 
interest and repayment terms, but recipient nations must also make a contribution to build in 
themselves a sense of partnership with Japan as donor, and take ownership of the project and 
consequently the will to look after it. 
 
Today Japan is not the only Asian nation that spends the bulk of its aid budget on infrastructure 
development projects. China, which came to appreciate Japan’s philosophy of loans over grants 
while itself a recipient of Japan’s ODA, has emerged over the last decade as a large aid donor 
and favors the use of aid loans. China is not a DAC member, but has risen quickly to challenge 
Japan’s presence in the field, displacing Japan as primary donor in many recipient nations. More 
recently, through its OBOR (One Belt and One Road), later named the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), China has announced that it will spend trillions of dollars on infrastructure development 
across several continents, linking the country to these continents through rail and shipping routes. 
In 2015, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which parallels the 
Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank (ADB) that has been operating since 1966. Some 
observers (e.g., Furuoka 2018) see that this development may have created some opportunities 
for cooperation between China and Japan through their institutional leadership, leading to win–
win situations for both donor and recipient nations, but so far cooperation has been limited and 
                                            
11  http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/OD
A-2017-complete-data-tables.pdf 
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mainly tactical. Competition is real and strategic, as Beijing’s foreign policy aspirations are for 
China to become a global power second to none, while Tokyo is not prepared to easily let go of 
Japan’s capacity for regional and global influence.  
 
Foreign Aid and ‘Quality’ in Growth and Infrastructure Development 
Developing Asia, although now undergoing much faster economic growth, suffers acutely from 
infrastructure deficits, which inhibit its involvement in the global economy. An Asian 
Development Bank report of 2009 estimated that US$8 trillion was required to fund 
infrastructure projects in Asia over the period 2010–20 (ADB 2009, 3). The Bank revised this 
figure for Asia in 2015, with an estimate of $26 trillion over a 15-year period, much greater than 
the 2009 estimate, and requiring more than U.S $1.5 trillion (at 2015 prices) annually for 2016–
30. The infrastructure gap varies across countries and sectors (ADB 2017). However, the 
domestic financial resources of developing Asia remain limited, and lending to it by regional and 
global institutions comes with strict financial, governance and regulatory conditions that many 
developing countries are unable to fulfil, as seen at the time of the Asian financial crisis in the 
late 1990s. 
 
Japan as one of the leading global aid donors has had infrastructure development funding 
mechanisms in place for decades. But in the late 1990s, as Japan went into recession and began 
to introduce budget cuts, its aid projects slowed. Suppliers and contractors for many of the 
Japan-funded projects were to come from local sources or third countries under Japan’s policy of 
generally untying aid, introduced when it became a leading ODA donor in the late 1980s (Rix 
1993, 108-12). Japanese business houses were disadvantaged as they could not offer competitive 
prices for projects. Their competitors abroad could offer much lower prices that were attractive 
to recipient nations. This situation began to change in the late 2000s when the Japanese 
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government moved to support Japanese businesses seeking to help the sluggish domestic 
economy recover through new forms of exports beyond manufactured products, a sector where 
Japan had lost its comparative advantage to new players such as South Korea and China. 
Infrastructure development projects for which Japan had the experience, technology and 
knowhow were identified as a potential new area of exports. In the light of the ADB reports 
mentioned above, and with a keen interest in funding more infrastructure projects overseas, 
Tokyo began to formulate its financing strategy for infrastructure development projects in Asia, 
using ODA loans in association with Japanese business and other stakeholders in Japan’s 
financial and government sectors. 
 
After more than a decade of rapid political turnover at the national level that saw uneven and 
ineffective approaches to national economic recovery, the return of Shinzo Abe as prime 
minister in 2012 brought economic growth to the frontline of the national policy agenda. His 
so-called Abenomics heralded a three-arrow approach to national economic growth: 
incorporating fiscal discipline, monetary stimulus, and structural reform. 
 
After vigorous discussion at party and cabinet levels, the Abe government issued an 
‘Infrastructure System Export Strategy’ in May 2013 and cabinet approved the ‘Japan 
Revitalization Strategy’ in June 2013. Abe’s initiative of the ‘Japan Revitalization Strategy – 
Japan is Back’ saw the launching of the third arrow of Abenomics, structural reform, to ‘restore 
the confidence of companies and people and change expectation into action.’12 One of the 
initiative’s three revitalization strategies was to pursue ‘global outreach and tap into expanding 
global markets.’ 
 
                                            
12 https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/1200485_7321.html 
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Japan’s most powerful business body, Keidanren, supported Abe’s agenda with a 2015 report on 
the government’s approach to infrastructure projects and the involvement of the public and 
private sectors. The Keidanren report suggested that financing bodies such as the Japan Overseas 
Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport & Urban Development (JOIN), the Japan 
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), overseas investment and financing by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the provision of insurance services by the Nippon 
Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) should be revamped. Strong support from business 
and their willingness to be part of this growth strategy, as the Keidanren report revealed, was a 
great booster for the Abe government (Keidanren 2015). 
 
Steps were then taken to embed the philosophy and practices of the Infrastructure Export 
Strategy within the strategic implementation of the ODA program. Moves included improving 
various measures using loans, grant aid and technical cooperation.13 In 2014 laws were revised 
or established to promote seamless infrastructure development projects. The ‘Japan 
Revitalization Strategy’ as revised in 2016, and the ‘Infrastructure System Export Strategy’ 
supported the strategic use of ODA to further promote the overseas expansion of Japanese 
corporations (MOFA 2017b, 259).14 Here was a new path for government–business cooperation 
in infrastructure developmental projects; the experiments of previous administrations with 
neo-liberal ideas of ‘market-led’ ‘small government’ approaches in the 1990s and early 2000s 
had failed to improve Japan’s stagnant economy. 
 
The Abe government set out to implement this new strategy. However, as noted earlier, by this 
time Japan was not the only Asian aid and infrastructure player with considerable funding to 
offer in the Asian marketplace. South Korea had joined DAC in 2010 and China had established 
                                            
13 https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/honbunEN.pdf 
14 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000287687.pdf 
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itself as a major player in the foreign aid market in Asia and elsewhere, with financial resources 
on a much larger scale than Japan to fund projects overseas (Shimomura and Ohashi 2013). The 
challenge for Japan was to maintain its aid influence – to keep its Asian partners on side and not 
allow them to be won over by China’s aid offensive. Japan’s response was to distinguish its aid 
from that of other donors by emphasizing the ‘quality’ of its ODA. 
 
Quantity–quality is a familiar trope in Japan’s aid discourse. When Japan became the number 
one aid donor in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many critics pointed out that its aid was largely 
‘quantity’ and not ‘quality’ (Rix 1993, 103-6), defined in terms of the percentage of tied/untied 
aid and loans versus grants (Hook and Zhang 1998, 1054). In the 2015 context however, policy 
planners had picked up on quality now as a defining feature. 
 
Why the emphasis on ODA ‘quality’ and what does it mean? Given that the strategic stakes in 
guiding development of the region’s infrastructure and connectivity are potentially huge, 
bid-winning project labels, these can be seen as strategically priceless for competing countries. 
Ready acceptance of an agreed quality label can lead to success in this situation. 
 
China began to spread its wings in the foreign aid space quite extensively in the 2000s, suppling 
aid to almost as many countries and continents as Japan and in some places such as Africa 
carving out an aid presence much larger than Japan’s.15 China began to project itself as a 
formidable international power, including using aid for this purpose, particularly with the 
coming of Xi Jinping as President in 2012. 16  With the establishment of AIIB and the 
announcement of the BRI project (initially OBOR), state-controlled financial institutions such as 
                                            
15  https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2018/03/25/japan-slowly-challenges-chinas-dominance-a
s-an-investor-in-africa/#7b278c683435 
16 For a detailed study of China’s foreign aid, especially how much China spends on aid, see Kitano 
(2018). 
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the China Development Bank, the Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC), pledged trillions of dollars in infrastructure projects. This is part of China’s grand 
strategic design to extend its financial and political influence across several continents. While 
countries like India, Japan and the United States have yet to endorse and join in these 
frameworks, many others, including US allies such as Australia and the UK have either become 
members or have endorsed China-initiated plans, even while remaining distrustful of Beijing’s 
strategic designs. Here was – and is – a formidable challenge to Japan’s influence in the region. 
 
The announcements of Beijing’s plans coincided with Abe’s 2012 return to power. Abe had 
made it abundantly clear that he would not sit back and be a decision taker; this time as prime 
minister he would be a decision-maker (Abe 2012). The economic and politico-strategic state of 
the region meant that involving Japanese companies in reaching out globally through new modes 
of engagement was not just a political economy project (as it was when Abe’s Liberal 
Democratic Party was not in power). The specter of China’s military assertiveness and ambitious 
geo-economic designs meant that Abenomics was launched to serve Japan’s national interests 
not simply as a source of domestic economic revitalization, but also as a strategic and 
geo-political project. Thus, the characterization of Japan’s ODA as ‘quality’ infrastructure is a 
direct response to economic and strategic competition from China. 
 
Global agencies and institutions have promoted the idea of quality infrastructure projects for 
some time. For example, APEC promoted ‘quality infrastructure’ with a set of guidelines on the 
‘Quality of Infrastructure Development and Investment’ in 2014. In these guidelines ‘Quality 
infrastructure’ meant that projects should consider the importance of lifecycle cost (including 
performance and durability), environment, safety, and maintainability at the outset of procuring 
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infrastructure.17 The UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030) also list ‘sustainable 
infrastructure projects’ as one of its several objectives. It is thus probable that Japan is at the 
forefront of promoting the quality infrastructure idea internationally, as can be observed in 
remarks by Angel Gurria, Secretary General of the OECD, who also endorses and supports 
quality infrastructure.18 Scholars and analysts have presented definitions and background on the 
idea of quality infrastructure in this light (Hirota 2017). 
 
Prime Minister Abe has been Japan’s most ardent and consistent advocate of ‘quality 
infrastructure.’ In May 2015 his announcements effectively introduced into the official discourse 
‘quality’ and ‘partnership,’ which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs later put forward as 
‘Partnership for Quality Infrastructure’ (PQI). This plan would have Japan, in collaboration with 
the ADB, invest $110 billion in infrastructure investment in Asia over five years from 2016 
(MOFA 2017, 311). PQI was embedded in Abenomics to promote quality exports with 
government support, to reinvigorate Japan’s economy and as a response to China’s 
trillion-dollar BRI initiatives. Japan’s partnership with the ADB aims to promote ‘quality 
infrastructure investment’ in Asia through Japan’s ODA and private Japanese investment, and by 
partnering with other countries and international funding agencies. 
 
At the G7 summit in Ise-Shima, Japan in May 2016, Prime Minister Abe announced the 
‘Expanded Partnership in Quality Infrastructure’ (EPQI) project, with public–private partnership 
financing of approximately $220bn for infrastructure development globally between 2016 and 
2021. G7 members endorsed this plan,19 a follow up on Abe’s initial PQI initiative at the 21st 
International Conference on the Future of Asia held in Tokyo in 2015.20 The generous terms of 
                                            
17 http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/apec/downloadfiles/150320_qualityinfra_eng.pdf 
18 http://www.oecd.org/governance/promoting-quality-infrastructure-japan-april-2018.htm 
19 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/27/g7-ise-shima-leaders-declaration 
20 https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201505/0521foaspeech.html 
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loans offered by China without sovereign guarantees had propelled Abe to announce that Japan 
would enhance its loan assistance systems and strengthen government institutions such as JICA 
for fast tracking project proposals and considering flexible terms for loans. MOFA notes that 
quality infrastructure investment is not just about the cost of investment but will also take into 
account such factors as sustainability, safety and resilience, local job creation, and human 
resource development in the recipient country (MOFA 2017b, 311). 
 
Public–private partnership for project finance is promoted to alleviate the possibly high risk for 
private investors in developing countries. Japan uses a wide range of public finance platforms 
including JICA, JBIC, NEXI, JOIN and JICT to mobilize the private sector in pursuit of such 
infrastructure projects, as recommended in the 2015 Keidanren report noted above. 
 
Japan proudly lists some of its previous projects as symbols of ‘quality’ infrastructure 
development. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially cites the Nhat Tran Bridge 
in Vietnam, opened in 2015 (MOFA 2017a, 12). Other examples of such ‘quality’ infrastructure 
development include connectivity projects in the Mekong River Region, which comprises 
Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Japan announced a New Tokyo Strategy for 
Mekong–Japan Cooperation at the Mekong–Japan Summit Meeting in July 2015 and allocated 
750 billion yen in ODA over the following three years, until the next meeting in Japan. Japan’s 
aim was to realize ‘Quality Growth’ characterized by inclusiveness, sustainability, and resilience 
in this region. At the subsequent October 2018 Japan–Mekong summit, Abe again pledged 
improvement in ‘connectivity’ and ‘quality infrastructure’ projects in the Mekong region. 
Engaging Mekong Region countries in Southeast Asia is clearly a significant part of Tokyo’s 
strategy to balance China’s growing presence in the region. 
 
 
 
19 
 
Under a new blueprint proposed at the Tokyo Strategy 2018 for Mekong–Japan Cooperation 
from 2019 to 2021, Japan pledged to support the Mekong countries with at least 150 projects. 
Some commentators have noted that as with its other initiatives, Tokyo now ‘appears to be trying 
to expand its economic foothold in the region to counter China’s growing influence’ (Yoshida 
2018).21 Japan has been a leading economic player in Southeast Asia, including in the Mekong 
region, for a long time. The difference now is that Tokyo views the area and its regions mainly 
through a strategic lens that recognizes such economic moves as also being intrinsic to national 
security. Tokyo’s  eager support for infrastructure development in the Mekong region as part of 
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept illustrates this well. 
 
Quality Infrastructure and a Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
In the light of his 2007 ‘Confluence of the two seas’ speech to the Indian parliament, Abe has 
actively advanced the concept of Indo-Pacific since returning to the position of national leader in 
2012. It is a departure from Japan’s earlier conceptual thinking about the Asia-Pacific, even 
though Japan has not discarded its Asia-Pacific identity and associated institutions. Nevertheless, 
the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has been embedded in recent official statements and documents such as 
diplomatic bluebooks and defence white papers. The Indo-Pacific concept acknowledges power 
shifts that are producing a new geo-strategic reality. Where US primacy is receding, China’s is 
becoming central, India is gaining strength on the global scene, and Africa is developing 
incipient importance particularly as source of influence (Pandey 2018). 
 
At the 2016 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) VI Ministerial 
Meeting in Kenya, Abe talked about ‘the union of two free and open oceans and two continents.’ 
                                            
21  https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/09/national/politics-diplomacy/mekong-japan-summit-to
kyo-eyes-economic-aid-pushback-chinese-influence/#.W71MfGwUmqI 
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This was later developed as Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy (MOFA 2017a, 
15; MOFA ICB 2017c). Assuming significant power for Japan, at least verbally, Abe claimed, 
‘Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and 
of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free 
from force or coercion, and making it prosperous.22 This is Tokyo’s new strategy to strengthen 
the rules-based international order to promote economic prosperity. The strategy rests on three 
pillars: 1) promoting the rule of law in the region; 2) promoting economic prosperity through 
quality infrastructure development and enhanced economic partnerships; and 3) developing 
individual or collective capacity to address security issues in areas such as maritime law 
enforcement and disaster prevention. 
 
Our discussion here is concerned with the second point, ‘quality infrastructure development.’ 
Infrastructure and connectivity projects are also part of Abe’s FOIP strategy and that emphasizes 
their role in creating stability and prosperity. Connectivity projects in Asia, and between Asia 
and Africa have therefore been on Japan’s agenda for some time. Examples include the 
Chabahar port development in Iran, the northern economic corridor development in East Africa, 
the Tanzania Digital Grid project, the Myanmar Thilawa Special Economic Zone, the Manila 
north–south commuter rail project, and many others. The Mombasa port development project in 
Kenya is touted as the gateway to and from East African states such as Uganda and Rwanda.23 
Japan’s Mekong engagement is also now linked to FOIP. At the 2018 Mekong summit in Tokyo, 
all leaders of the Mekong region threw their support behind the FOIP concept that Abe 
articulated. 
 
                                            
22 https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html 
23 Many of these projects are included in a presentation given by a special advisor to the Prime Minister 
of Japan, Mr Sonoura, at a UN General Assembly High-level side event (2017).  
 
 
21 
 
Also as part of his strategy to strengthen cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, at the June 2018 
Future of Asia meeting, Abe announced plans to establish a $50 billion fund over three years to 
boost infrastructure investment in Asia. He claimed, ‘We hope this will serve to assist in the 
building of high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region,’ 24 defining ‘high-quality 
infrastructure’ as investments that increase employment, expand educational opportunities for 
workers, and attract even more foreign domestic investment—and as a result make Japan’s loans 
easy to pay back.25 
 
Japan’s ODA to India and Quality Infrastructure Projects  
With the understanding of the concepts of quality growth, quality infrastructure projects and 
quality infrastructure partnership in Japan’s contemporary ODA narrative as articulated above, 
the paper now turns to the case of Japan’s quality infrastructure aid projects in India and focuses 
on the high-speed train project now under way there. As we have seen, Japan’s interest in and 
provision of aid to India is long standing, making aid a long-lasting and strong connector in the 
bilateral relationship. India became the first recipient of Japan’s yen loans when Tokyo began 
the program in 1958. Although there have been some ups and downs in the aid relationship, the 
only break – and then for a brief period – was to express Japan’s deep concern at India’s nuclear 
testing in 1998 (Jain 2017). 
 
The ‘quality infrastructure’ narrative was introduced into Japan’s ODA discourse only in recent 
years. Even so, Tokyo has listed as examples of quality infrastructure the Delhi Metro project 
and some other projects in India that have been in progress since the late 1990s. Japan’s ODA 
                                            
24 One of my interviewees at the JICA Tokyo office recalled that at the time of Abe’s ‘quality 
infrastructure development’ announcement at the Future of Asia International Conference, very few in 
Japan understood what the concept was to mean and how it would be executed. 
25  https://financialtribune.com/articles/world-economy/87974/abe-pledges-50b-for-infrastructure-in-ind
o-pacific-region 
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projects in India focus on the transport sector, such as mass transit,26 so it may not be a surprise 
that Japan has provided more than $3bn for electric track systems and double stack container 
wagons, and automated signaling and telecommunication systems to support the huge Delhi–
Mumbai Industrial Corridor project. The Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial corridor covering the 
three states of Karnataka, Andhra and Tamil Nadu is another example of Japan’s funding of 
infrastructure projects in India through its ODA. These earlier loans are no doubt Japanese 
‘quality’ projects in terms of funding, technology, human resource development, safety, and 
timeliness, and even in transforming work culture (Sakamoto 2016), but they may not be 
strategically and politically inclined in the way that Tokyo now pursues through its ODA 
program and other strategic initiatives. 
 
Japan’s aid projects today are shaped by and embedded in its geo-political outlook, in pursuit of 
‘pro-active contribution to peace’ and in support of the FOIP. Japan aims to create networks 
around the two oceans with like-minded nations that support Tokyo’s FOIP vision. Japan’s reach 
into Africa, the South Pacific, ‘broader’ Asia and elsewhere is part of this strategy. In this 
scenario Japan views India’s emergence as a crucial player capable of balancing China’s rising 
and expanding influence in support of Japan’s broad strategic vision. Japan’s ODA for the first 
bullet train in India was shaped profoundly by this strategic thinking.27 The project is above all 
politico-strategic, although undoubtedly concern for economic development and social and 
political consequences is also present.  
 
                                            
26 Japan’s emphasis in India is on transport, over 60 percent of its ODA loans are in this sector. Much of 
this transport funding is in metro train projects for mass transit, thus reducing reliance on private 
transport. 
27 There are other politico-strategic projects supported by Japan in India, such as those related to India’s 
northeast, an undeveloped part of India, which can serve as important links to some of India’s 
neighbours such as Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/japan-teams-up-with-india-for-north
east-to-extend-rs-2239-crore-loans/articleshow/60703906.cms 
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The Bullet Train 
Japan’s eagerness to use its ODA program to support funding for India’s first HSR based on the 
bullet train technology was tied to its domestic and foreign policy objectives to export quality 
infrastructure and pursue large-scale projects in emerging Asian markets as part of Abenomics. 
It was also a vehicle that would enable pursuit of other geo-political goals so important for Japan 
as an international actor at this time of major power shifts regionally and globally. India is 
willing to cooperate with Japan in pursuing these objectives, as it is a special strategic and global 
partner of Japan and for some time has been the largest recipient of Japan’s aid. Here India could 
achieve its dream to build its first high-speed train, financing of which had previously remained 
elusive, with support through Japan’s generous ODA package. 
 
Japan’s Failures: Some of the Japanese government’s earlier attempts to export new types of 
projects have suffered serious setbacks by losing out on much hoped-for contracts in the 
Indo-Pacific to its competitors. 28 But most painful for Japan was the bid to build an HSR in 
Indonesia, running from the capital Jakarta to Bandung, that it lost out on to China. Planning for 
this project had started in 2009, and Japan had offered funding through its generous long-term 
low-interest ODA program for 75 percent of the cost, running to $5bn. 
 
Japan lost despite its reputation not only as a world-class train maker, its first-class technology 
and its accident-free history, as well as its extensive links with Indonesia. Tokyo initially seemed 
confident it would secure the HSR project, but with the coming of Indonesia’s new president in 
2014 the circumstances began to shift. Joko Widodo visited both Japan and China the following 
year and while in China in April 2015 signed an official memorandum with Chinese President Xi 
                                            
28 Other major contracts were for a suspension bridge in Turkey that went to South Korea and a 
multi-billion submarine project in Australia that France secured. Japan’s bid to export nuclear power 
technology also has had no successes so far. 
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Jinping. In this memorandum, Beijing expressed strong interest in the Jakarta–Bandung HSR, as 
China had already entered the competitive bidding process for the project. China offered to 
cover the entire cost of the project (although with a higher interest rate) and to complete the 
project much sooner than Japan had proposed, with no requirements for sovereign guarantee.29 
 
China’s offer was highly attractive to Indonesia, a fact that became clear in September 2015 
when Jakarta announced its choice of China rather than Japan to build the railway. Japan was 
clearly disappointed at its loss, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga calling the decision 
‘extremely regrettable’ and ‘difficult to understand.’ But the Japanese response also reached 
beyond disappointment, viewing China’s winning of the bid as ‘a harbinger of further 
humiliating and costly defeats in competition for Asian infrastructure projects’.30 Indonesia’s 
decision was also a huge shock to Japan because Southeast Asia had long been Japan’s central 
investment, trade, and aid destination (Pavlicevic and Kratz 2017). Other signs from this 
subregion also signaled poor results for Japan, as China also succeeded in securing high speed 
train projects in Laos and Thailand as part of the BRI connectivity projects.31 
 
Japan had made exporting HSR a part of its new diplomacy in Asia since it was confident it 
could secure projects given its extensive experience of running high-speed trains in Japan since 
1964. Japan, with Europe, had provided China with the technical knowhow for HSR, but today 
China is the world’s HSR leader. The China HSR network of about 25,000km is more than the 
rest of the world’s HSRs combined. China’s new-generation Fuxing (Rejuvenation) train 
commissioned in 2017 runs at a speed of 350 kph, the world’s fastest train that runs on track, and 
                                            
29 For detailed coverage, see 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2015/10/01/japans-rail-project-loss-to-china-why-it-matters
-for-abes-economic-diplomacy-and-for-chinas/#3c803a0f2fae. 
30  https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2015/10/01/japans-rail-project-loss-to-china-why-it-matt
ers-for-abes-economic-diplomacy-and-for-chinas/#7c48c5852fae 
31 http://investvine.com/thailand-laos-china-enter-talks-high-speed-railway/ 
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it covers the 1,300-kilometer distance between Beijing and Shanghai in about 4½ hours 
(Takekoshi 2018). Nevertheless, ‘quality’ is a key selling point of Japan’s HSR, comprising 
proven safety record, inclusion of human resource development, provision of responsible 
financing, and so forth. These aspects of Japan’s HSR bids thus contrast with those of China, 
whose project financing model has raised concerns and attracted the critical label of ‘debt-trap 
diplomacy,’ with push back from a number of countries including Sri Lanka and Malaysia.32 
 
Success in India: Such humiliating results for Japan’s proposed infrastructure projects in 
Southeast Asia were in the foreground when its bid for India’s first HSR was prepared. Even so, 
Japan held a glimmer of hope for a positive outcome through the closer, deeper, and 
wide-ranging networks it has developed with India over recent years, as outlined above. 
 
India has a vast rail network with more than 12,000 trains carrying roughly 23 million 
passengers daily.33 But the technology is old and the top speed of even the few fastest trains in 
India is roughly 150kmh – then only on specific routes and in limited zones. Even the most 
recent addition of a fast train, touted to be the fastest in India - Train 18 or the Vande Bharat 
Express from Delhi (the capital city) to Varanasi (PM Modi’s electoral constituency) will only 
have a top speed of 130Km. The country’s safety record is particularly poor, trains run behind 
schedule routinely and innovation and modernization have been minimal. India’s economic 
growth from the beginning of the century has however inspired a burgeoning middle-class 
population to demand better, faster, and more comfortable transportation, as also seen in the 
rapid growth in the number of airlines. Moreover, India’s railway service is way behind that of 
many of its Asian neighbors, and it has  no HSR. While India is often compared with China in 
                                            
32  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/27/chinas-debt-traps-around-the-
world-are-a-trademark-of-its-imperialist-ambitions/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6c0963e6a796 
33 https://www.ibef.org/industry/indian-railways.aspx 
 
 
26 
 
terms of potential for economic growth, market capacity, and as a major power, it does not have 
an HSR system, whereas China has the largest HSR network and fastest trains in the world. 
 
Recognizing the importance of advanced railways in other parts of Asia, especially China, the 
Ministry of Railways in India first proposed an HSR system in 2007–2008. The idea gained 
currency with the Ministry’s 2009 Vision 2020, which recommended four HSR projects in the 
north, south, east, and west regions. Many more routes including a ‘Diamond Quadrilateral’ 
connecting India’s four metropolitan cities: Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai have 
subsequently been suggested. Progress on any of these proposals has been slow for a number of 
reasons, finance being the key factor. In this context, both China and Japan have begun to 
express interest in India’s HSR projects.34 
 
The first route chosen for an HSR was from Mumbai to Ahmedabad, connecting India’s 
financial capital with one of its major trading centres.35 JICA and India’s Ministry of Railways 
undertook a joint feasibility study in 2013–2015. When PM Abe visited New Delhi in January 
2014, the prime ministers’ joint statement ‘welcomed the commencement of that joint feasibility 
study and the issuance of the inception report on a High Speed Railway system on the Mumbai–
Ahmedabad route.’36 The feasibility study was begun and the decision to build the first HSR in 
India on the Mumbai–Ahmedabad route was made under the government of Manmohan Singh 
(2004-14), when Modi’s party was in opposition. But the coming of Narendra Modi as India’s 
prime minister in 2014 brought new momentum to the HSR project as Modi had included 
building high speed trains in India among his election promises. 37 Ahmedabad is Modi’s 
                                            
34 Meanwhile, an India-China consortium, and France and Spain are also involved in various feasibility 
studies for HSR on different routes in India.  
35 Many of the factual details outlined here were provided by the JICA Delhi office and its headquarters 
in Tokyo. 
36 https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/diplomatic/201401/25india_e.html 
37 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-41251210 
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hometown, giving him a special interest in this project. Prime Minister Abe, who was pushing 
for infrastructure exports, and Prime Minister Modi, who promised to build an HSR system in 
India, thus constituted a perfect alignment of interests. 
 
At the December 2015 annual summit meeting, Modi and Abe welcomed a memorandum of 
understanding and confirmed that the HSR in India would use Japan’s Shinkansen bullet train 
system.38 The joint statement from the 2016 summit devoted a long section to ‘partnership for 
prosperity,’ covering a range of cooperation areas related to the HSR that dovetailed with Modi’s 
‘Make in India’ and ‘Skill India’ initiatives. The statement, also announced some scheduling, 
including a ground-breaking ceremony in 2017, commencement of construction by the end of 
2018, and operations beginning in 2023. The subsequent 2017 joint statement highlighted the 
‘quality infrastructure narrative emphasizing ‘safety, resilience, social and environment impacts, 
and job creation as well as capacity building for the local communities,’ as well as 
commencement of the project and ‘satisfaction at ‘the steady progress.’39 
 
This discussion clarifies that the Indian government offered the HSR contract to Japan without 
any competitive process, making it essentially a political and strategic project. The move was 
backgrounded by their growing strategic and defence linkages and the convergence in their 
geo-political thinking. If economics were the key factor, India would have gone for a 
competitive process, as is always the case with such large-scale projects. European suppliers 
would have been attractive too because of their advanced technology and long experience in 
running high-speed trains. However, the costs and benefits of this project reached beyond 
economics into geostrategic politics. The Japanese bid not only supported the infrastructure 
exports proposed in Abenomics but would also be the first giant infrastructure project for Japan 
                                            
38 https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/_ 
39 https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28946/IndiaJapan 
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after deep disappointment and shock at its recent project-bid failures, especially in Indonesia. 
For India, Japan’s overly generous loan terms and willingness to support Modi’s ‘Make in India’ 
and ‘Skill India’ through training and technology transfer were highly attractive and suited 
Modi’s political agenda. 
 
Japan agreed to introduce its advanced technology in the project through human resource 
development, maintenance, management of the HSR, and technology transfer (MOFA 2017, 
211). The shared aim is to promote the flow of people and goods in India, revitalize the Indian 
economy, and transfer Japan’s safe and high-performance technology, ‘which makes this project 
a good example of quality infrastructure development’ (MOFA 2017, 211). Tokyo hopes this 
project may serve as a model to help Japan secure similar outcomes in other countries seeking to 
undertake quality infrastructure projects. 
 
Japan’s HSR project in India is thus, so far, a win–win project. September 14, 2017, the day the 
two prime ministers laid the foundation stone for the project, will go down in the history of 
Indian railways as a ‘great leap forward.’ How this project progresses will therefore have huge 
consequences for both India and Japan, especially for the two current prime ministers who have 
made it their personal and political project and put all available resources behind it. It is also 
consequential for Japan’s future ODA projects for infrastructure development, in India, 
elsewhere in Asia, and beyond. 
 
The HSR project has generally been welcomed in India, but voices of disapproval have also 
erupted, occasionally with some concerns from the Japanese side too. Supporters include most 
officials, political leaders, and business people in both countries. JICA is generally enthusiastic 
about the HSR following the successful Delhi Metro example, although some of the 
interviewees in this study cautioned that completion of the project depends on timely land 
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acquisition, securing construction materials, smooth coordination with relevant stakeholders and 
the timely mobilization of resources.40 On the other hand, the JICA chief representative in India, 
Mr Takema Sakamoto, referred often in interviews to the book America in Ruins: The Decaying 
Infrastructure, to reassure onlookers about Japan’s quality infrastructure history and the fact that 
its current exports to India are characterized by resilience; sensitivity to investment impact, 
environmental impact and social impact; life cycle costing, disaster safety, timely completion, 
and so forth. 
 
Nevertheless, a most serious concern for policy makers in Tokyo is the Indian government’s 
expectation that the project will be completed by August 2022 to coincide with the 75th 
anniversary of India’s independence, one year ahead of its scheduled completion in December 
2023. Some are even raising the possibility of a partial opening of the rail project in 2022 to fulfil 
Modi’s ambitious target. 41 Others in India regard the project as ‘an inflection point.’ For 
example, ‘As Maruti [in collaboration with Japan’s Suzuki] generated for India’s automobile 
industry, it [HSR] could build a structure essential for the transformation of India’s lifeline’ 
(Dayal 2017). On the other hand, even the former chief of Delhi Metro, E. Sreedharan observed 
that HSRs cater only to the elite since they are very expensive to operate and therefore beyond 
the reach of ordinary people.42 Others have described the project as ‘a story of white elephant 
and public debt.’ 43  These concerns may be genuine, but India is a land of contrast and 
co-existence, with modernity and tradition, old and new, fast and slow. 
 
                                            
40 Interviews conducted at JICA Tokyo in January 2018. 
41  https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Trends/India-considers-partial-opening-of-first-high-speed
-rail-project 
42  https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bullet-trains-are-for-elites-india-needs-a-safe-rail-syste
m-says-e-sreedharan/story-NKouCz8nKksaX6WvgN9B3J.html_ 
43 http://www.cadtm.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=15517 
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India’s present circumstances, including its rising economic and strategic stature, therefore 
suggest there should be multiple benefits from the HSR for the Indian nation and people, for the 
present and the future, especially given the nature of India’s constructive relationship with its 
project partner, Japan. However, serious concerns relate to land acquisition for the railway and 
the opposition to this. Farmers have moved their opposition to the Indian High Court, claiming 
that the government has violated land acquisition guidelines. Reports in September 2018 even 
suggested that JICA had stopped releasing new funds for the project pending a court decision, 
but India’s National High-Speed Rail Corporation quickly denied this suggestion. 44  The 
Corporation’s comment was supported by the signing of an Exchange of Notes for yen loans for 
on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail project during the Abe-Modi summit in 2018.45 
 
Conclusions 
The discussion in this paper of Japan’s ODA-funded and recently begun bullet train  project in 
India provides new insights into Japan’s current aid thinking, especially through the ‘quality 
infrastructure’ lens of its aid narrative. This narrative is as much about Japan’s political economy 
and Abenomics as it is about Japan’s strategic thinking expressed in ‘proactive contribution to 
peace,’ its ‘national security strategy,’  and its support for a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific.’ 
Perhaps that is inevitable, since today Japan’s quest for involvement in establishing 
infrastructure and connectivity within Asia and beyond has profound consequences that are both 
economic and strategic. To some extent they are strategic because they are economic; Japan’s 
                                            
44  https://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/japan-stops-funding-for-pm-modi-s-ambitious-bullet-train-pr
oject-after-farmers-complaint-353666.html 
45 https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30543/IndiaJapan_Vision_Statement; there are 
two types of ODA loans concerning the Mumbai-Ahmedabad HSR: 1) construction of a training 
institute agreement; 2) construction of the HSR itself. For the first, the loan agreement was signed in 
September 2017 (https://www.jica.go.jp/india/english/office/topics/press170915_01.html), while for the 
second, two agreements were signed in September 2018, 
https://www.jica.go.jp/india/english/office/topics/press180928_01.html and October 2018 
https://www.jica.go.jp/india/english/office/topics/press181030_04.html 
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stature regionally and globally is linked inextricably to its national economic strength. The 
challenge Japan perceives in the swift rise of China as geo-political and economic power, 
regionally and globally, is central to this thinking. Engaging in ‘quality’ infrastructure export, 
such as the HSR project in India, facilitates for Japan an approach to dealing with domestic 
political and economic concerns as well as external challenges, in one potentially masterful 
move. Its symbolic and precedent-setting value is a useful potential spinoff. 
 
Today, Japan finds in India an ideal match for its economic–strategic needs. Tokyo fast tracked 
the offer of an unprecedentedly huge aid allocation for a single project to construct India’s first 
HSR, after losing out to China on an HSR project in Indonesia. Luck was in for Prime Minister 
Abe on its timing. In India Narendra Modi’s party won the general election and formed a 
government in 2014, and the rapport developed between Abe and Modi is unprecedented for the 
Prime Ministers of these two Asian nations. The project that began to take shape during Singh’s 
administration would have progressed too, though perhaps more slowly and cautiously, but 
under Modi the process was turbocharged, as it fitted neatly into his political and economic 
agenda. A memorandum was signed, loans approved, and work commenced at a speed that is 
rare in international government-to-government projects. 
 
The HSR bullet train project in India is an important test case for Japan’s new strategy of quality 
infrastructure export and its success or otherwise will be watched closely in both countries and 
elsewhere. Never ever has Tokyo funded a single large project like this one through its overly 
generous yen loan program, administered through JICA. Here India may serve as an entry point 
for Japan to demonstrate, especially to developing nations in Asia but so too in Africa, its 
capacity to possibly provide them with ‘quality infrastructure’ through its ODA program, just as 
Japan did with its first yen loans to India in 1958 (Jain 2017). The move gives Japanese 
companies opportunities to expand their business operations overseas and gives the Japanese 
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government opportunities to expand its diplomatic networks, in this instance in India in support 
of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda. Vitally, ‘quality infrastructure’ development like this 
HSR project in India presents opportunities for the providing nation to help guide development 
of the region’s infrastructure and connectivity. For Japan such leverage is a particularly valuable 
source of competitive edge over China, its most pressing rival. For India, the HSR is a landmark 
project in its 21st century aspirations to move on to the next level of economic development. The 
project’s success or otherwise will reflect not only on the current prime minister, but also on the 
nation as a whole. 
 
Japan and India are essentially on the same page regarding the politico-economic dimensions of 
the project and understanding of its politico-strategic dimensions. There seems to be some 
variation in the two nations’ objectives in undertaking this project, but national self-interest is to 
be expected and mutually recognized. Furthermore, India may not consistently support Japan’s 
regional strategic views, especially on China, since India refracts through its own diplomatic and 
strategic lens. India has reason to try to play a diplomatically skilful game with both Japan and 
China to affirm its ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘multi-alignment,’ rather than participate directly in 
the intensely strategic relationship between Japan and China. 
 
Overall, the HSR project in India signifies a new height in Japan–India relations, a relationship 
that began on a positive trajectory only in the first decade of this century. If, how, and how much 
Japan’s “quality” infrastructure projects can prevail over China’s massive schemes for 
trade-promoting infrastructure within and beyond the region remains to be seen. But on a 
bilateral basis, successful completion of this project is likely to lead to many other collaborative 
initiatives between Japan and India in wide-ranging fields. 
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Abstract (in Japanese) 
要約 
 
本論文は、一国向けとしては最大規模の円借款案件であるインド高速鉄道案件を支
援する日本の動機について分析するものである。本論文では、「質の高いインフラ」
に重点を置く、ODA に関する日本政府の新しい思考の戦略的基盤を検討し、インド高
速鉄道事業はその性格、規模および立地から見て、今日の日本の戦略的援助の際立っ
た実例であると主張する。「総合安全保障」との関連では、インド高速鉄道事業は日
本の経済的利益のみならず安全保障上の利益をも考慮したものとなっている。将来の
巨大市場としてのインドの経済的潜在性は日本にとって大きな魅力であるが、日本の
インドへの関心を高めさせたのは、何よりも、地域的およびグローバルなパワーシフ
トの文脈におけるインドの戦略的重要性である。インド高速鉄道事業の多様な戦略的
側面は、日本の主要な経済的及び戦略的な競合相手である中国の動向の強い影響を受
けている。こうした状況は、南アジア地域のインフラ開発を主導することの戦略的重
要性を高めている。このため、日本の「質の高いインフラ」支援としてのインド高速
鉄道事業は、今日の日印関係のみならず、日本政府の戦略的な援助思想に関する新し
い洞察を提供するものとなっている。 
 
キーワード：日本、ODA、日印関係、質の高いインフラ、高速鉄道、援助を巡る政治（Aid 
Politics）、戦略的援助 
